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1. Introduction 
Whatever our metaphysics of time, today we usually work with the assumption that we have 
one unified temporal framework which allows for situating all events, processes, and happen-
ings. What do I mean by this? Let us say that today there may be a battle in Syria, you are 
reading a philosophy paper, the Dalai Lama may be engaged in some meditation, and in the 
Austrian Alps the first avalanche of the season may come down – these things have nothing 
to do with each other, they are very different things, some of them are physical things, some 
mental, some occurrences in nature, others in the human world, and yet we would note down 
all these occurrences in the very same calendar; we could, for example, say of each event that 
it happened on Wednesday the 6th of January 2017 (if that is when they happen). For us, all 
these things happen in the same time, we have a common framework for them all so that no 
matter which occurrences or processes we talk about, they can be put in a temporal relation to 
each other; they are either before, after, or simultaneous with each other. 
For the early Greeks, by contrast, the very idea of such a unified notion of time would 
be foreign; instead they assume different temporal (and not necessarily comparable) struc-
tures belonging to different events. Not only do we not find a unified calendar throughout the 
ancient Greek world; more importantly, we also do not find a unified notion or idea of time 
before Plato. In this paper I want to show that such a unified framework is lacking in the very 
beginning of Western thinking and what effect this lack has on the quality of temporal expe-
riences – it means that different temporal experiences are thus seen as experiences of genu-
inely different kinds.  
With the exception of Anaximander and Empedocles, the philosophers before Plato 
hardly ever discuss temporal notions. For this reason and in order to make sure that we cap-
ture the earliest expressions of temporal notions, I will mainly discuss temporal ideas in non-
philosophical authors before Plato. But these texts will not be looked at for merely historic 
reasons; rather they shall be shown to articulate an understanding of temporal structures that 
2 
 
 
questions many of our modern temporal conceptions. A look at ancient notions of time sug-
gests that our notion of time as unified is not something we gain directly from experience, but 
rather that such a unified conception is an interpretative or theoretical overlay. 
 
2. Lack of unification 
Today we distinguish different aspects of temporal experience,i such as duration, sequence 
(i.e., the temporal order of before and after), those aspects that we express in terms of differ-
ent tenses (recalling the past, facing the present, and anticipating the future), and, perhaps, the 
passage of time.ii But all these features are seen as different aspects of one unified time 
(“time” in the singular). If we look at the early ancient Greeks, by contrast, what we count as 
different aspects seem to be different types of experiences altogether. There are different 
kinds of temporal notions capturing different kinds of temporal experiences that are in the 
beginning not connected with each other: (1) there are notions of duration; (2) notions indi-
cating sequence; (3) notions indicating measurable time; (4) notions linking time with agen-
cy; and (5) tense.  
 Some of the literature on memory has pointed out the fragmented character of 
memory, that it contains gaps, as well as different and, in part, disjoint narrativesiii – features 
that also could be seen as suggesting that our conception of time as unified may not be some-
thing we can take for granted. We will see, however, that the disunity for the early Greeks is 
of a somewhat different kind – with them we are not dealing with gaps that are due to things 
being forgotten, some lack of memory; rather there are several temporal aspects that are not 
seen as belonging to the same kind of experience; furthermore, these disunities cannot simply 
to be brought into a linear succession, as John Campbell thinks is ultimately possible for all 
autobiographical memory.iv 
Let us have a closer look at the different kinds of temporal notions in early Greek 
thinking; due to constraints of space, I will only be able to give a very rough sketch and to 
point to a few examples for each notion.v 
(1) “Chronos” is the most important notion of duration; scholars often understand it as the 
equivalent to our term “time” in such a way that other temporal notions could be subsumed 
under it. However, this is in fact only the case from Plato onwards. In the very beginning of 
Greek thinking, chronos indicates solely a particular time span – it is either qualified as a 
long or short time, or simply by itself understood as a long time. But chronos originally does 
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not indicate a time that is measured with the help of any units; rather we are just experiencing 
something as lasting for some duration or as (too) long. Let me give you two of the earliest 
examples, from Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey: 
In Iliad Book III, the old leaders of the Trojans sit upon the wall and when they see 
Helen coming upon the wall they say to each other:  
 
There is no blame on Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans if for a long time (πολὺν χρόνον) 
they suffered hardship for such a woman; wondrously like is she to the immortal goddesses to 
look upon (lines 156-158). 
 
Chronos qualified by the adjective “long” is also what we find in Odyssey book V, where we 
hear that when Odysseus is sailing off from Calypso, he gets into a storm, his mast breaks 
and he is thrown into the sea:  
 
As for him, long time (πολὺν χρόνον) did the wave hold him in the depths, nor could he rise 
at once from beneath the onrush of the mighty wave, for the garments which beautiful Calyp-
so had given him weighed him down (lines 319-321). 
 
In both passages chronos is qualified as a long time; and both passages show that chronos is 
not only used to express a long duration, but, fairly typically for the early understanding of 
chronos, a particular long time, namely a negative time (the time Odysseus is under water, 
the time suffered in the case of the Trojans). There is a lot of waiting and wandering around 
in the Iliad and Odyssey and it is here especially where chronos comes in. This suggests that 
chronos is not simply understood as a neutral temporal framework (which embraces all 
events and lets us locate every process and event), but rather as expressing a specific emo-
tional experience of duration. And chronos does not seem to be used to serve the interest of 
chronology. This does not mean that there cannot be a very sophisticated architecture of nar-
rative time. For the Iliad, for example, Taplin has shown how the fourteen actually narrated 
days in the Iliad are marked by clear signs of closure and anticipation, and the role that the 
sequence of night, dawn, midday, etc. plays.vi But if we attempt to reconstruct the exact se-
quence of events of the Trojan War with the help of the Iliad, we famously get entangled in 
inconsistencies.vii There is no suggestion that chronos provides us with an overall framework 
or is an essential part of a chronology (as the different days and nights are). While we do find 
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relations of order in the Iliad and Odyssey – with the unfolding of the narrative as well as 
with the sequence of night, dawn, midday, etc. – these definite relations are not explicitly 
linked to the experienced duration; there are no points that can serve as markers within 
chronos in its earliest occurrences. 
This usage of chronos in Homer also suggests that our sense of duration need not be 
connected with measurabilityviii in the sense that we can say at least roughly how long some-
thing lastedix – a connection, which, for example, Mayo assumes as naturally given.x Accord-
ing to Mayo, we “cannot endure through an interval of time without measuring it” (1950, 
71).xi By contrast, in Homer we find the idea that a certain duration is just experienced as too 
long, or even endless seeming. It is not connected with the idea of measurability by the narra-
tor, and we have no reason to assume that Odysseus had a sense of how much time had 
elapsed since he got under the wave. 
 
(2) There are basic notions indicating sequence, like “before” and “after”. These notions do 
not yet give us measurability, but are in some sense more basic: for it may be the case that we 
can tell whether one event happened before or after another event (or simultaneously, for that 
matter), without thus necessarily knowing how much before or after they took place or how 
long either X nor Y lasted; all we may be able to say is that X occurred before Y. Usually, 
earlier and later ordering is asymmetric, not reflexive, and transitive.xii  
In early Greek thinking, notions like “before” (proteron) and “after” (hysteron) are of-
ten expressed as adjectives, but never as adjectives qualifying chronos.xiii Rather they seem to 
qualify people or things, like properties of things, so we find talk about “andres proteroi” 
(“former men”, Iliad XXI.405) and “anthropoi proteroi” (“former human beings”, Iliad 
V.637, XXIII.332 and Theogony, line 100). In translations the adjective “former” or “old” is 
usually applied to times, but for Homer and Hesiod it is literally applied to human beings.  
 
(3) There are a couple of temporal notions that express certain temporal units bound to natu-
ral processes and thus express what we can call measurable time; for example, hêmera, the 
day, meis, the month, or eniautos, the year. But it is only from the 5th century BCE onwards 
that chronos is seen as what is measured with the help of these temporal units. So in Sopho-
cles’ Oedipus at Colonus lines 607ff. we find the idea that “chronos brings forth countless 
nights and days.” Here measurable time (expressed in terms of units of time like night and 
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day) is connected with long time (chronos) by having chronos bring forth nights and days – 
presumably as its parts, so that we can say how much chronos has passed. But before the tra-
gedians, these temporal units do not seem to measure something else, time, as we would as-
sume. For example, in Homer we find the expression “as the year rolled round, and the sea-
sons came on” as a standard phrase expressing long time – “year” and “season” do not meas-
ure time; rather they themselves are what rolls around and comes on.  
Moreover, these units are not always primarily used for exact quantitative measure-
ment; rather they often also have a qualitative sense. Thus different days of the month can be 
seen as suitable or unsuitable for certain activities, for example, the twelfth day is good for 
weaving since then also the spider allegedly weaves its web.xiv A day is the unity that con-
nects different experiences togetherxv and can also be identified with the fate experienced.xvi 
 
(4) There are temporal notions indicating agency, like kairos, which means the right or a crit-
ical time. Kairos as the appropriate or critical time has no connection with measurable time, 
and it is also not connected with the duration expressed by chronos. Its original meaning is 
“due measure”, “proportion”, “what is vital”, which is then interpreted in a temporal sense to 
mean the critical time or opportunity to act.  
Kairos is a notion that is of special importance in early medical writings: in the pro-
cess of healing certain times are especially critical for applying a treatment and for the suc-
cess of the healing process. For example, in the treatise Regimen in acute diseases, a part of 
the Hippocratic corpus, we find a discussion of kairos as the right time to administer gruel 
(one of the main medical drugs, it seems, at that time). Unseasonable (that is, going against 
the kairos) administration of gruel or unseasonable feeding or fasting is understood to lead to 
attacks in the body.xvii And in the treatise On Fracture kairos is the vital point of time in the 
healing of a fracture: it can be dangerous for the whole healing process or exactly the right 
time to apply some treatment.  
Kairos is also prominently used in the context of Pindar’s odes celebrating the win-
ners of Olympic (and other panhellenic) Games.xviii But it is not, as one might expect, the crit-
ical time the winner grasps in order to gain victory in the competition. Rather, it is a time for 
right action more generally: for example, in Pindar’s Olympian Ode II, lines 54-56, we hear 
that Theron, ruler of Akragas and winner of the chariot race in the Olympic Games in 476 
BCE, has “wealth embellished with virtue”, which is what provides kairos for achievements. 
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Wealth combined with virtue (arête) is what will lead to the right time for successful agency. 
What is characteristic of kairos is also that it has to be grasped quickly; otherwise the oppor-
tunity may be lost. 
As the critical time to do something now that will have important consequences for 
later, kairos intimately ties the present to the future: I act now so as to bring about a certain 
effect in the future, for example, the healing of a patient. My intention for my action in this 
critical time can be seen as essentially future directed.xix 
 
(5) Finally, the experience we express with the help of tense is also not connected with the 
experience of chronos. While there seems to be a clear awareness of what we call the arrow 
of time early on, it is only with Plato that the direction of time is clearly coupled with 
chronos. And in early Greek thinking we also find the possibility entertained that for moral or 
metaphysical reasons the normal direction of time might be reversed. For example, in Hesi-
od’s Works and Days, we find the idea that acting in accordance with the seasons is the only 
way for us human beings to keep temporality as well as morality under control. Only this will 
ensure that rivers will not run backwards and babies will not be born grey. The threat of chil-
dren being born with grey hair because of moral chaos shows how temporal order is seen as 
closely bound up with moral order: our immoral actions will turn the normal temporal struc-
tures upside down. 
 Comprehending how exactly tense is understood by the ancient Greeks is complicated 
by three factors:  
(a) What we take as the grammatical tenses of the Greek verb can be as much an indication of 
aspect as of tense, and especially express aspect in the moods other than the indicative. The 
three basic stems of the Greek verb – present, aorist, and perfect – correspond to three basic 
kinds of aspect – durative, punctual or completed, and resultant or stative. If we look, for ex-
ample, at the verb form we classify as the past tense aorist in Greek, this verb form may 
simply express the punctual character of a happening, rather than the idea of a past happen-
ing.xx 
(b) Furthermore, what we would call the present tense is not only understood as indicating the 
present moment (day, year, etc.). Rather, some philosophers relatively early on understand it 
also as indicating something outside of time, something like eternal truths.xxi The first hint in 
this direction we find in Parmenides’ poem, which claims that what truly is “neither was nor 
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will be, since it is now, all at once”.xxii As a result past, present, and future tense are not nec-
essarily understood as referring to temporal dimensions on the same footing, on what we 
since McTaggart understand as the A-series. Rather, on this understanding of the present 
tense, it is opposed to past and future. 
We may think that this understanding of the present is only to be found with some 
philosophers, but in fact Parmenides’ understanding of the present as indicating eternity 
seems to take up Hesiod’s account of the “race of the blessed” as those who always are (αἰὲν 
ἐόντων). And the present is also treated remarkably differently than past and future when 
Homer and Hesiod take it as the point of view from which we look to past and future things. 
Today we usually talk about “past, present, and future” (or the other way round) as a linear 
sequence that is independent of the person experiencing it. By contrast, Homer and Hesiod 
usually talk about the present first, then about the future, and finally about past things: it is 
“things that are, shall be, and were”.xxiii True, this is a poetic formula for all things, present, 
future, past, and so may be seen simply as a different way of talking. But it is remarkable that 
the order given is not linear; rather the relation of the different dimensions is seen from the 
perspective of our experiences – it starts from where we are, here in the present moment, goes 
forward to the future things, and then backward to the past ones.xxiv 
(c) Finally, words explicitly expressing “the future”, and not just “future things”, are 
only relatively late phenomena. In order to express the future time we do find the term 
“chronos” specified by an adjective or participle of motion (for example, by “epherpôn”, 
which means creeping up, or “mellôn”, meaning that one is about to do something). But we 
only find these expressions centuries after Homer and Hesiod. Interestingly they all seem to 
be found first in Pindar in the first half of the 5th century BCE, so with a poet who is actually 
paid for writing odes praising past victories in sportive competitions. One way in which the 
future is understood in Pindar is as something that is already there and has now, in the pre-
sent, come to us: “Approaching from far away, the future has arrived and made me ashamed 
of my deep debt” (Olympian Ode 10, 7).xxv 
 
The understanding of temporal structures I have sketched so far concerns early Greek think-
ing. But this thinking develops soon afterwards: first the notion of chronos becomes the dom-
inant temporal notion and is connected with the idea of measurement. Furthermore, there is 
increasing demand from the historians for a unified temporal framework.xxvi And finally with 
8 
 
 
Plato we do indeed get what we can understand as a unified account of time.xxvii However, 
given the limits of space here, rather than looking at this process of unification, what I will do 
in the second part of this paper is spell out what the lack of a unified notion of time in early 
Greek thinking means for human temporal experience. 
 
3. Consequences for Temporal Experience 
In contrast to us, the early Greeks were much more oriented towards the motions of the sun 
and stars, and their time was structured much more by these motions than by clocks.xxviii 
There were certain kinds of clocks available, like sun-dials and water-clocks, but they did not 
structure the normal rhythm of the day (water-clocks, for example, were prominently used to 
make sure accuser and defender at trials got the same amount of speaking time). And the no-
tion of hours became important only in the 4th century BCE.xxix 
While these features do distinguish how time structures the daily rhythm of the early 
Greeks in contrast to our rhythm, these features are not necessarily an expression of a lack of 
a unified temporal framework. But what does give us a foretaste of the consequences for hu-
man experience of time, if a unified notion of time is missing, is a brief look at the lack of a 
unified calendar throughout the early Greek world, which has several philosophically inter-
esting aspects: the early Greeks worked with local calendars, in which not only the beginning 
of the year, but also the beginning of the month differed from one city-state to the next. It was 
not meant to help dating events on a more than local level.xxx The Olympic Games were not 
used as a general dating system across the Greek world before the classical period.xxxi 
Furthermore, not only were the calendars not synchronised between different poleis, 
also within one polis more than one dating system may be used: if we look at the Athenian 
calendar, which is the best attested Greek calendar we have,xxxii we see that the Athenians 
lived with at least two different calendars simultaneously, each used for different purposes: 
there was a calendar for the festivals which consisted of 12 months based on the cycle of the 
moon,xxxiii and a “political” calendar regulating the economic and administrative life, which 
consisted of 10 months and was based on the motions of the sun.xxxiv Originally these two 
calendars did not necessarily begin or end on the same days. And finally for agricultural 
planning the risings of stars were employed for fixing points in time.xxxv 
Moreover, originally there seems to have been very little interest in the ordering of 
years. While our modern calendar allows for distinguishing each year by a serial number 
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from all other years, accommodating any future or past date, the Attic calendar was not origi-
nally set up for such a sequential ordering of years and did not provide an easy way to do so. 
In Athens, the different years were identified by the names of the magistrates in power in a 
given year, which allows for ordering years back in time for a couple of generations, but it 
did not provide a means to date forward (in the way in which we talk about, say, “in 2050”). 
The year for the Greeks was first and foremost marked out by the alteration of summer and 
winter, not by absolute serial numbers; events were dated relative to other events. (Of course, 
also for us, the number we give to years is not absolute but refers to the years after the birth 
of Christ or the Hijri of Mohammed, or some other significant event. This significant event is, 
however, kept as a fixed point, with respect to which all years are determined; by contrast, 
with the early Greeks, some events used for local dating seem to have lost their relevance 
soon after the dating, and so were not used any longer.) 
 Finally there is a lot of what we may call “manipulations” of the calendar: the dura-
tion of each month was not fixed in advance, but could vary. Furthermore, the coordination 
between the solar and the lunar year was initially done by inserting an additional month every 
now and then simply by repeating an existing month (as if we would say “between December 
and February we will have January twice”). While the astronomers suggested different cycles 
for inserting the additional months, it seems that the poleis did not adhere to a fixed pattern 
for these insertions.xxxvi And in general, the calendar could be subject to political or military 
concerns, controlled by the magistrates.xxxvii Given these possibilities for ad hoc manipula-
tions, in addition to the fact that one city-state would base its calendar on the successions of 
its main politicians, another one on the term of office of its main priestess, etc., we should not 
be surprised to see, for example, that Thucydides has to put some effort into telling his read-
ers when the battles he describes in his book are happening.xxxviii  
But as mentioned already above, the lack of a unified calendar is an expression of a 
more basic lack in conceptual unity. One reason for this lack of a unified temporal framework 
is also one of the most important differences between early Greek conceptions of time and 
more modern ones: the fact that past, present, and future were not seen as being on the same 
footing in a linear sequence. This is not a question of existence, as we find it in contemporary 
presentist discussions about the question whether only the present or what is present ex-
istsxxxix or also the past and future (or what is past and future). Rather what we are facing with 
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these early Greeks is the lack of thinking of past, present, and future as constituting a linear 
order (a linear order presentists can also subscribe to). 
For the early Greeks the present seems to indicate a point of view from which we look 
towards the past or the future. Contra presentists and growing block theorists the future also 
in some sense may be there already, but, in contrast to block universe theorists, the present is 
distinct vis-à-vis the past and the future, and in contrast to moving spotlight theorist we do 
not find any hint of the idea of the objective passage of the present. 
Furthermore, for the early Greeks, present actions are seen as less directly prepared 
for by actions in the past so that I could say “I am doing X today so that I can do Y tomor-
row, and Z the day after tomorrow”, since the idea that different days have different qualities 
in ways important for our actions and that we have to seize the right moment for an action is 
much more dominant. And the right moment cannot necessarily be brought about by us; ra-
ther we have to react to whatever the present moment may bring, and cannot assume that our 
planning in the past will prepare us for an action now or in the future. One way the coming 
about of the right moment can be influenced to some degree, however, is by leading a virtu-
ous life – we saw the idea that morality can either prepare the possibility for the right time to 
come about (as in Pindar), or that moral chaos can lead to temporal chaos in the sense that 
immoral behaviour can deform normal temporal structures (as in Hesiod). 
Also the conceptualisation of the future is remarkably different: the future seems not 
to have been viewed as a predictable extension of our present on the calendar given that we 
do not know in advance when exactly the current month will end nor is it easy to specify 
years in advance. To some degree future-directedness may be integrated with the present in 
the notion of kairos, the idea of a crucial time to act which will have important effects later 
on. But again this is not a future that is in any sense predictable or can be planned by us. In 
general there seems to have been much less planning in the way we are used to, for which a 
unified and convenient calendar is an important precondition (and much less conceptual pos-
sibility to do so). Rather, the most important planning is independent of the succession of 
years according to serial numbers: it is either agricultural planning,xl which is done in accord-
ance with the seasons, or the planning of civic duties, which is also not tied to the progression 
of years, but to the repetition of the political cycle. While there certainly was some planning 
into the future, for example, for organizing the panhellenic games and other festivities, this 
form of planning could also basically work within a cyclical notion (of four years, in the case 
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of the Olympic Games), and would hardly needed to rely on the sequential ordering of years. 
In some sense the future seems to have been treated more similar to the past: for the agricul-
tural calendar with the cyclical repetition of the seasons, the future does not seem to differ 
very much from the past, since if the harvest time is now in the future, it will soon be past, 
and then future again. This treatment of the future may also be one reason why it is never ex-
pressed as a subject until the 5th century.xli 
Furthermore, the aspect of an action was sometimes more important than its exact 
temporal location. So at times it seems to have been more significant to express whether 
some process or state of affairs is finished or continuing, whether it is durative or point-like. 
Finally, we saw that the different temporal notions are not related to each other – no-
tions of succession, of duration, of measurable time, and of agency describe completely inde-
pendent temporal aspects tied to different kinds of experiences (as we would, perhaps think 
of a business meeting and hiking on our own through the Scottish Highlands as unrelated ex-
periences, even though we could of course still put them in the same calendar). Also in con-
temporary thought we sometimes use exact, discrete dating alongside inexact, analogue no-
tions of duration or of past, present, and future. But these inexact notions nevertheless are 
such that in principle they could be made more precise – if we talk about a time that is too 
long lasting because it is wasted, we are usually able to translate this easily into “I have wast-
ed a whole day”, or even “two wholly wasted hours”.xlii So there is no problem for us to con-
nect the duration that is lasting too long with a measuring framework (even if the measure-
ment may not be very precise). By contrast, the early Greeks would not necessarily embed a 
time that lasts too long in their calendar. Such a time may not be related to the idea of meas-
urability and there does not seem to be an expectation that all the different temporal phenom-
ena are compatible by being situated in a common framework.xliii 
And this is exactly one point where the early Greek conceptualisation of temporal 
structures may be philosophically fruitful for us: even if in scientific and historic contexts a 
unified temporal framework is essential, in other contexts assuming less of a unified under-
standing of all temporal occurrences may do more justice to the way we experience the 
world. We are used to being able to put everything into one calendar and to structuring our 
experiences to some degree according to this calendar (tomorrow I will do X from 9am to 
10am, so that I am then prepared for doing Y from 10am to noon, etc.). But some experiences 
clearly seem to have their own temporal structure, that we cannot know beforehand, and that 
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we thus cannot integrate into our calendar plan in the same way, as when we meet a friend, or 
when we develop a thought – can we really say that developing this idea will take me one 
hour, so I block one hour of the day for that? And if we want to console somebody in her 
grief or attempt to forget something – do these actions not have their own temporal structures 
that we cannot anticipate in advance?xliv  
Of course we will be able to situate them in our calendar afterwards, but in the cases 
named there is no way to know their temporal structure (their duration, exact order, and spe-
cific markers) in advance. Here our temporal experience may be formed almost exclusively 
by what is done, and not by a neutral temporal framework. Accordingly, we do more justice 
to these occurrences if we approach them by letting them unfold their own temporal structure; 
and we may get into problems if we start by assuming them to be compatible with our stand-
ard scheduling – the way we use our calendars for future happenings suggests that we could 
know or at least estimate their temporal duration within a neutral framework.  
Furthermore, we all know the phenomenon that our experience of time depends on 
what is done during this time (time is experienced as short if lots of things happen, but as 
long, if nothing is done during this time) and also on how involved we are, for example, 
whether we are agents of a certain event or not. The fact that our perception of temporal 
structures seems to depend on agency – we seem to perceive events as occurring closer in 
time when they are an action of ours and further apart if they are notxlv – also shows that in a 
non-scientific context we are not simply starting from a neutral temporal framework in which 
everything gets objectively measured in its temporal duration. Implicitly we are working with 
a much less unified understanding of time. And the early Greeks show us that such a unified 
and neutral account is much less natural and obvious than we may typically assume.xlvi  
Bibliography: 
Andersen, H. (2013) “The Representation of Time in Agency,” in H. Dyke and A. Bardon 
(ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bickermann, E. (1968) Chronology of the ancient world, London: Thames&Hudson. 
Campbell, J. (1997) “The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory,” European Jour-
nal of Philosophy 5, 105-118.  
Christesen, P. (2007) Olympic Victor Lists and Ancient Greek History, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
13 
 
 
Fränkel, H. (1955)“Die Zeitauffassung in der frühgriechischen Literatur,” in F. Tietze (ed.) 
Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens, Munich: Beck, 1-22.  
Friedman, W. (1990) About time: inventing the fourth dimension, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT 
Press. 
Haggard, P., Clark, S., and Kalogeras, J. (2002) “Voluntary action and conscious awareness,” 
Nature Neuroscience 5, 382-385. 
Hallowell, I. (1937) “Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Pre-literate Soci-
ety,” American Anthropologist 39, 647- 670. 
Hesiod (1943) Works and Days, in H. Evelyn-White (ed. and trans.), Hesiod, the Homeric 
Hymns and Homerica, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
Homer (1924 and 1925) The Iliad, trans. A.T. Murray, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press, volume I and II.  
     –    (1919) The Odyssey, trans. A.T. Murray, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
Hippocrates (1959) Regimen in acute diseases, trans. W.H.S. Jones, Cambridge (Mass.): Har-
vard University Press.  
  –    (1960) On Fracture, trans. E.T. Withington, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press. 
James, W. (1890) The principles of Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Krantz, D., Luce, D., Suppes, P. and Tversky, A. (2006) Foundations of Measurement, San 
Diego: Academic Press. 
Kühner, R. and Gerth, B. (1898) “Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache, Zwei-
ter Teil: Satzlehre,” vol. 1, Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung. 
Le Poidevin, R. (2000) “The Experience and Perception of Time,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
Mayo, B. (1950) “Is There a Sense of Duration?,” Mind 59, 71-78. 
McCormack, T. and Hanley, M, (2011) “Children’s reasoning about the temporal order of 
past and future events,” Cognitive Development 26, 299-314. 
Meritt, B. D. (1928) The Athenian calendar in the fifth century, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard 
University Press. 
Onians, R. B. (1954) The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, 
the World, Time and Fate, Cambridge: CUP. 
Owen, G. E. L. (1966) “Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present”, Monist 50, 317-340. 
14 
 
 
Parmenides, Fragmente, in H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Ber-
lin: Weidmann'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 
Pindar (1997) Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.  
Pöppel, E. (1978) “Time Perception”, in R. Held et al. (eds.), Handbook of Sensory Physiolo-
gy, Vol. VIII: Perception, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Pritchett, W. K. and Neugebauer, O. (1947) The calendars of Athens, Cambridge (Mass.): 
Harvard University Press. 
Sattler, B. Natural Philosophy in Ancient Times: Logical, Methodological, and Mathematical 
Foundations for the Theory of Motion, book manuscript. 
     –    Ancient Notions of Time, book manuscript. 
Sophocles (1964) Oedipus at Colonus, in M. Griffith, G. Most, D. Grene, and R. Lattimore 
(eds. and trans.), Sophocles I, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Taplin, O. (1992) Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Theunissen, M. (2000) Pindar. Menschenlos und Wende der Zeit, Munich: Beck.  
Thucydides (1919 and 1921) History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. C.F. Smith, Cam-
bridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, vol. I and III. 
Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i By “temporal experience” I want to understand not only our conscious (perceptual) experience of time and 
temporal phenomena, but also our psychological relation to time more generally. 
ii See, for example, Le Poidevin 2000 and Pöppel 1978. 
iii See Campbell 1997, 107. 
iv Campbell 1997, 108 understands autobiographic memory as linearly structured since he sees it as based on our 
“conception of the self as spatiotemporally continuous”. 
v For a fuller discussion see my book manuscript Ancient Notions of Time.  
vi See Taplin 1992, especially 14-26. 
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vii For example, the famous Pylaimenes inconsistency: king Pylaimenes is killed in book V of the Iliad, but re-
appears to mourn the death of his son Harpalion in book XIII. 
viii We know, of course, that the Greeks were besieging Troy for nine years, but it is not chronos that is meas-
ured in years. 
ix By measure I do not simply mean that some period is taken to be too short or just right or too long (which 
presumably is a comparison with whatever we take the right time to be). Thus, I am not working with mere or-
dinal measurements where all that is preserved of the things to be measured is order but no concatenations can 
be taken into account, cf. Krantz et al. 2006, 2-3 and 11. Rather, I understand by measurement here that we are 
dealing with cases where we can also say that two days are twice as long as one day and that there may be so 
and so many days to a month or year. 
x Mayo 1950, 71–8 
xi For Mayo the “sense of duration and the faculty of measuring length of time are the same thing” (71) – an 
assumption which seems doubtful if we look at the understanding of temporal experiences in early Greeks times. 
xii Cf. also Campbell 1997, 105. 
xiii We also find hysteron used as a temporal adverb, for example, in Iliad I, 27 or VII, 30. 
xiv Cf., for example, Hesiod, Works and Days, lines 764 ff. and Onians 1954, 411-415. 
xv Cf. Fränkel 1955.  
xvi Onians 1954, 413f. He describes such a day as not lasting just a day but “as a phase of fortune of greater or 
less duration”. 
xvii Cf. especially, Regimen in acute diseases XX, XXXV, and XLI. 
xviii Cf. Theunissen 2000. 
xix For a similar structure in modern debates on agency cf., for example, Andersen 2013, 472. 
xx Cf. Kühner and Gerth 1898, §381. 
xxi This is a function of the present we are of course used to, for example, when we say “2 plus 2 is 4”, but it is a 
function that is only developing in early Greek thinking. 
xxii Cf. Owen 1966 for reading this as indicating eternity, and my defence of it in my Natural Philosophy in An-
cient Times, which should also make it clear why I do not think Parmenides can be understood as a “Block Uni-
verse” theorist, as some people have claimed him to be. 
xxiii Cf. Iliad I, 70 and, Theogony 38. In Hesiod’s Theogony 32-33 we find “things that shall be and things that 
were before; and they bade me sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are”. Here the present does not 
get the status of the point from which we look at past and future things. But again the present is not on the same 
footing as past and future; rather, it refers to everlastingness. 
xxiv Interestingly, James 1890 in his account of the present uses a similar language: “the practically cognized 
present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breath of its own on which we sit perched, and from 
which we look in two directions into time” (609, my italics). However, this does not prevent him from under-
standing time as a linear sequence (see, for example, 629). 
xxv Cf. also Nemean Ode 4, 43, Olympian Ode 8, 28 and Fränkel 1955.  
xxvi Cf. also Williams 2002, 154 and chapter 3. 
xxvii See my book manuscript Ancient Notions of Time. 
xxviii This orientation was of course the case in most later times and changed only relatively late in history. 
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xxix Cf. Bickermann 1968, 15. 
xxx While we are used to the differences between the Gregorian and other calendars, like the Jewish or Islamic 
one, we also have a clear mode of converting one into the other. With the ancient Greeks, by contrast, this was 
much more difficult, since in each local calendar a lot was done on an ad hoc basis. 
xxxi Hippias of Elis is reported to have compiled the first victor lists around 400 BCE, see Christesen 2007, 2 and 
47-48. But even from the classical period onwards, these lists seem to have been used mainly by chronographers 
and historians, while, according to Christesen 11, “individual communities continued to maintain their own epo-
nym systems”. 
xxxii Cf. Bickermann 1968, 34. Unfortunately, our testimony for the Athenian calendar is mainly from the 5th 
century onwards, so from a somewhat later time than the one I am mainly focusing on (and presumably after 
important reforms in the official calendar under Kleisthenes in the late 6th century). 
xxxiii Even though the purpose of this calendar was mainly religious in the 5th century, it is usually called the 
“civil calendar” in the literature. Because some effort was made to connect it also with the solar year, it is also 
called a luni-solar calendar; for both points see Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, 5. 
xxxiv This second calendar is called the “prytany calendar” or “senatorial calendar”, see Pritchett and Neugebau-
er, 35. See Meritt 1928, 123ff. for the relationship between prytany (senatorial) and civil years. 
xxxv As we find it, for example, in Hesiod’s Works and Days. 
xxxvi See Bickermann 1968, 28-30 and 35. In Athens only the civil calendar was tempered with, while the pryta-
ny calendar seems to have been free from intercalation, see Bickermann, 37 and Meritt, 71. 
xxxvii For example, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, V, 54 reports on the attempt of the Argives to manipu-
late the calendar in such a way as to get a few more days of fighting before the holy month would start when 
battles were forbidden; cf. Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, 4-5.  
xxxviii See Thucydides, beginning of book II, where he dates the beginning of the Peloponnesian war by referring 
to the dating system of the three most important poleis, to the priesthood at Argos, the ephor at Sparta, and the 
archon at Athens, as well as to the “16th month after the battle of Poteidea” and the opening of spring. 
xxxix Or whether everything that is is present. 
xl One of the central points of Hesiod’s Works and Days. 
xli Developmental literature on time suggests that reasoning about the future requires abilities in addition to those 
about the past so that, at least in early child development, understanding of past and future are not simply on the 
same footing (see McCormack and Hanley 2011, especially 303 and 311). Reasoning about past events only 
requires retrieving a sequence from memory and then reasoning about it, while reasoning about future events in 
addition requires the mental construction of a novel series of events. 
xlii And we may use relative dating in identifying a past event as having occurred before the fall of the Berlin 
Wall or as having taken place on the day of the Brexit referendum. But, again, we usually assume that we can 
translate this into a dating relative to the birth of Christ, etc.  
xliii Research on temporal notions in other cultures has also pointed out that our Western understanding of time is 
“neither natural nor intuitive but is the result of a gradual, constructive process” (so Friedman 1990, 103). Per-
haps the most interesting understanding of time for us that Friedman discusses is that of the Mursi in Ethiopia, 
for whom our exact position in a lunar cycle is not a question of exact measurement but of social consensus 
(105). 
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xliv Hallowell (1932, 656-657) has pointed out that when he was doing research with the Saultaux of Canada it 
was hard to arrange a particular time in the day to meet a person, because common reference points of time were 
lacking, social occasions simply start when people are ready. 
xlv See Haggard et al. 2002. 
xlvi I want to thank Michael Della Rocca, Stephen Halliwell, John Kennedy, and Ian Phillips for helpful com-
ments on the paper. 
